The past decade has seen notable development of conceptual engineering – a field of analytical philosophy that focuses on the critical evaluation of concepts. Most authors engaged with this area identify Rudolf Carnap’s ideas as its methodological framework and theoretical origin, placing particular emphasis on the philosopher’s method of explication. This article highlights the unquestionable influence Carnap’s thought had on conceptual engineering whilst by no means reducing it to the utilisation and advancement of explication within this field of analytical philosophy: (...) indeed, conceptual engineering has incorporated – and brought to the forefront – much broader tenets of Carnap’s concept. This study draws on a series of the philosopher’s works, as well as his ‘Intellectual Autobiography’, to trace the evolution of his ideas about language and describe the fundamental elements revealing the ‘engineering perspective’ in his reflection. Most clearly, this perspective is evident in his interpretation of logic as a conceptual tool for acquiring and processing knowledge, ‘assembling’ it into a structure and refining the procedures of logic itself. It is shown that the origins of the engineering perspective trace back, on the one hand, to Carnap’s interest in the methodological framework of physics, particularly the measurement problem and its epistemological analysis, and, on the other, his fascination with interpretations of the nature of mathematical theory and the idea of unifying logicism and formalism by introducing the principle of tolerance, which adds a pragmatic dimension to methodology. The article examines in detail the idea of explication and its theoretical origins, which lie, in particular, in Carnap’s intention to exactify the notions expressing the degree of validity and probability. His idea of a link between the results of explication and its goal became the central principle of conceptual engineering, distinguishing it from mere conceptual analysis. It is concluded that, when considered together, Carnap’s two major ideas – explication and the principle of tolerance – can be placed in a broader context of a project seeking a rational reconstruction of the life of society and providing it with knowledge-based underpinnings. (shrink)

The article is an overview of the problems on the topic of figurativeness in scientific discourse. The analysis was carried out in three perspectives: “conceptual” - the key ideas about the role of figurativeness in the formation of scientific discourse (about metaphorical schemes that lie in the processes of thinking and scientific conceptualization, about the need to identify and analyze these schemes in science, about the role of comparison and analogy in the conceptual and semantic deployment of scientific discourse); “narrative” (...) - the ideas about the function of figurativeness in the development of the author’s ontology are considered (the problems of constructing a rhetorical “Self” in scientific discourse, “self-identifying narrative”, “scientific identity”); “communicative” - the specificity of figurativeness is revealed in connection with the problem of knowledge transfer and modern strategies for popularizing science. It is shown that in the context of the modern identification of the “rhetoric” of scientific communication and discussion of strategies for science popularizing, the research topic is characterized by particular relevance. The analysis of figurativeness in scientific discourse touches upon the problem of the dialogue between science and society, which is important for our time, and how scientific achievements fit into socio-cultural and educational contexts. It is shown that the scientific significance of the study of figurativeness in scientific discourse is manifested in the fact that it allows, firstly, to expand the concept of “scientific”, revising the ideals of academic scientificity, often translating a view of science as an “emotionally emasculated” “substrate” of objective and transparent truth, and thereby overcome the existing communicative “barrier” between society and the scientific community; secondly, to rethink ideas about the communicative specifics of scientific creativity and the role of language in constructing the semantic and logical-methodological space of science. (shrink)

This article focuses on public philosophy, the main approaches to interpreting it, current ways for philosophy to reach the public, and obstacles to this. A major hindrance is that philosophy is an area of professional expertise. This circumstance has both conduced to the development of a large close-knit academic community and enfeebled its already weak communication ties with society and other fields of scientific knowledge. It is argued that, on the one hand, publicness has been immanent in philosophy from the (...) very beginning, and, on the other, philosophy needs a public upgrade and a new experience of a constructive dialogue with society. This new publicness of philosophy may be the way to recovery it. It is also shown that tendency towards greater publicness, which is distinctive of modern academic sciences, is a response to the new economic situation. Sciences are becoming engaged in an info-struggle for the attention of the state and society. This is affecting philosophy as well, although the value and importance of philosophical knowledge have been traditionally recognised and emphasised in culture and by the education system. It is stressed that the idea of recovering philosophy is closely linked to what function the philosopher has in the life of society. The contribution considers various possible types of public philosophers. It is concluded that, contrary to the common belief, society needs not an expert philosopher or a mediator in the field of science but a professional consultant capable of calibrating the thinking routines of people and helping them adopt a rational attitude towards themselves, that is, acquire an ability to think critically, form a conscious judgement of their life, and take responsibility for their decisions. (shrink)